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Chapter 22 
 
A New Hate? The War for Disney’s Star Wars 
 
William Proctor 
 
 
“It is a battle that has been raging for more than four decades. No, not Team Luke vs 
Team Vader but the ongoing war for the soul of Star Wars”  
—Ben Child, The Guardian 
 
“Boycotting Star Wars is like boycotting the sun. It will do nothing. The sun 
will keep on shining. Its heat will remain radiant and globally present. It will 
remain at the center of this space and we will continue to orbit it in an 
elliptical manner. Your efforts will have no meaningful result except to 
reveal yourself as a cruddy dingleberry dangling from fandom’s ass-hairs” 
—Chuck Wendig 
 
“The internet is…the largest experiment in anarchy that we’ve ever had”  
—Eric Schmidt, former CEO of Google  
 
 
Since the theatrical release of The Force Awakens in December 2015, Disney has 
continued to expand and extend the Star Wars imaginary world across various media 
platforms, sparking a frenetic groundswell of franchise activity that has since been 
criticised in entertainment journalism for “oversaturating” the cinema market (Cotter 
2018; Rubin 2018; Sims 2018). By the time the final episode of the Skywalker Saga is 
released in December 2019, Disney will have produced five new live-action Star 
Wars films in four years, with perhaps a sixth to follow hot on the heels in 2020 
should Rian Johnson’s trilogy continue as planned (Bui 2018). With another trilogy 
announced, spearheaded by Game of Thrones showrunners David Benioff and D.B 
Weiss, as well as the return of cancelled animated show, The Clone Wars, the anime-
styled Star Wars: Resistance series and Jon Favreau’s live-action television series, 
there certainly seems to be an unusual amount of Star Wars media planned for the 
immediate future, at least in comparison with the history of the franchise under 
George Lucas’ reign. Taking into account the fact that Lucas produced six films 
across almost three decades, albeit with an eighteen-year inter-regnum period between 
the original and prequel trilogies, it has since become a matter of debate whether or 
not Disney’s annual release strategy in cinematic terms has backfired. Since the 
enormously divisive The Last Jedi hit theatres in December 2017, and the 
disappointing box office performance of Solo: A Star Wars Story in May 2018, 
entertainment critics have been hard at work hypothesizing whether the cultural and 
economic health of the brand is lately underpinned by so-called “franchise fatigue,” or 
“toxic” fan boycotts.  
 Since at least the debut of The Force Awakens teaser trailer in December 
2014, a substantial amount of entertainment journalism and fan blogs have focused on 
what has been viewed as a salient proliferation of “toxicity” within Star Wars 
fandom, a criticism that more often than not has over-amplified and exaggerated the 
quantity of racist and misogynist rhetoric by excluding other voices that have been 
pushing back vigorously against a (very loud) vocal minority taking place across 
various online territories (which is in no way an attempt to claim that they do not 
exist). In this final chapter of Disney’s Star Wars: Forces of Production, Promotion 
and Reception, I want to address the way in which the franchise has become ensnared 
in the “new culture wars,” considering the way in which a certain “regime of truth” 
has been constructed in entertainment press discourse. As Michel Foucault (1980, 
131) explains: 
 
Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms 
of constraint.  And it induces regular effects of power.  Each society has its 
regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourse 
which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances 
which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by 
which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in 
the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what 
counts as true. 
 
 
The Flame Wars Saga 
 
It is hardly surprising that Disney’s acquisition of Lucasfilm would spark new 
infarctions, rifts and quarrels over the Star Wars franchise as “a ‘transitional object,’ 
with a new phase or new hope being offered to audiences, [which] then seems to very 
much become a moment of heightened fan feeling, and anxiety” (Hills quoted in 
Proctor 2013, 206). The major difference between past and present, however, would 
be provided by the inception and impact of domesticated internet technologies, 
especially the more recent emergence of social media platforms and portals that 
afford media audiences the means with which to participate in cultural dialogue in 
more significant ways than ever before in human history. The internet and the 
participatory affordances of Web 2.0 would inaugurate radical shifts in contemporary 
communication in all sorts of ways, including the way in which fan “communities” 
migrated from marginal ghettos and into mainstream awareness and heightened 
visibility. This so-called “mainstreaming” of fan cultures has also served to 
demonstrate quite convincingly that the idea of fan “community” or “culture” as a 
homogenous, singular and coherent body is less be-fitting an understanding of 
“fandom” as “a network of networks, or a loose affiliation of sub-subcultures, all 
specializing in different modes of fan activity” (Hills 2017, 860). In this light, the 
projection of Star Wars fandom (or any fandom for that matter) as a coherent 
“community” can no longer withstand scrutiny—if perhaps it ever could considering 
what almost three decades of fan studies has revealed—despite its commonality 
across academic disciplines.  
As the war for Star Wars moved into cyberspace and onto forums and 
message boards two decades ago, this notion of “community” was radically punctured 
as fans reacted to Lucas’ first Star Wars film in eighteen years, The Phantom Menace. 
As discussed in chapter one of this volume, Will Brooker captured a snapshot of fan 
debate and discord during this period by showing the way in which hostility and 
aggression between first generation Star Wars fans and younger fans of The Phantom 
Menace became heated. Thus, “to talk of the fan reaction or the fan viewpoint is to 
impose an imagined consensus on a community that thrives on debate” (Brooker 
2002, 113). Although Brooker’s use of the term “community” here, and in the title of 
the monograph from which this comes, is surely problematic given the lack of 
consensus he describes, it is assuredly early evidence of spirited and often heated 
fannish quarrel occurring in online quarters. However, this is not an intrinsic 
symptom of fandom per se. “Flame Wars”, that is, “vitriolic online exchanges,” have 
been a characteristic of cyberculture since the internet’s earliest days, as examined by 
authors in Mark Dery’s edited collection, Flame Wars: The Discourse of 
Cyberculture, twenty-five years ago (1994, 1). 
This does not necessarily mean that impassioned fans enact “toxic” behaviours 
exactly, however: “as an innate part of fan experiences, ‘thriving on debate’ is not 
necessarily a signifier of toxicity…unless it falls into the realm of bullying, racism, 
misogyny, homophobia, transphobia, or other types of ad hominem attacks,” such as 
rape or death threats (Proctor and Kies 2018, 137). For instance, African-American 
actor, Ahmed Best, has recently opened up about the fan reaction to his role as CG-
character Jar Jar Binks in The Phantom Menace, stating that the fan backlash was so 
fierce that he considered taking his own life (Raftery 2017). Fans complained in 
droves and even started a website, Jar Jar Must Die (jarjarmustdie.com) and an 
internet discussion group on deja.com included 13,000 commenters angrily railing 
against the character, as reported by Eric Harris of The Los Angeles Times (1999). 
Moreover, entertainment critics added to the storm by accusing Lucas—and by 
extension, Best—of racial stereotyping, with The Wall Street Journal describing the 
world’s first digital character as “a Rastafarian Stepin Fetchit on platform hoofs, 
crossed annoyingly with Butterfly McQueen” (Harris 1999). At the time, Best 
claimed that he didn’t “pay attention to that stuff” and recognized its “stupidity” 
(Smith 1999), but it has since become clear that the backlash affected his 
psychological wellbeing more seriously: 
 
I think the people who are saying those things are very much in touch with 
the racism inside themselves. They sense African-American descent, and all 
they can think of is Stepin Fetchit. They can't compare it to Jerry Lewis or 
Buster Keaton or even Jackie Chan (Smith 1999).  
 
What is noteworthy here is that the majority of fans were calling out The Phantom 
Menace for perceived racism, for stereotyping and “othering” ethnic minorities, 
which also included the Neimodian race caricaturizing Asian people, or the money-
grubbing Toydarian, Watto, as an offensive Jewish stereotype (Brooker 2001). 
Sending death threats to Best tagged with anti-racist sentiment means that “toxicity” 
does not always come from reactionary quarters, but from more politically 
progressive avenues, complicating the notion that “toxic fan practices” are invariably 
right-wing in nature. That said, Best says that he “was shocked with the racial 
implications, but always knew they had little to no merit” (Raftery 2017). From this 
perspective, whether Binks is racist or not becomes a matter of debate and 
interpretation, indicating that the war for Star Wars shouldn’t be oversimplified by a 
neat semiotic split into binary camps of “good” versus “evil.”  
I now want to move onto the way in which Star Wars under Disney’s aegis 
has been paralleled by the emergence of the so-called “alt-right,” a period that is 
being described in discourse as “the new culture wars,” and a battleground where 
popular culture has become a site of ideological conflict and negotiation.  
 
Gamergate, the New Culture Wars and the “Alt-Right” 
 
Although often criticised for romanticizing the power of fan audiences, Henry Jenkins 
has on numerous occasions attempted to clarify his argument. In his afterword for the 
2008 paperback edition of the seminal Convergence Culture, Jenkins emphasised that:  
 
Those of us who care about the future of participatory culture as a 
mechanism for promoting diversity and enabling democracy do the world no 
favor if we ignore the ways that our current culture falls short of these goals. 
Too often, there is a tendency to read all grassroots media as somehow 
‘resistant’ to dominant institutions rather than acknowledging that citizens 
sometimes deploy bottom-up means to keep others down. Too often, we have 
fallen into the trap of seeing democracy as an ‘inevitable’ outcome of 
technology change rather than as something which we need to fight to 
achieve with every tool at our disposal. Too often, we have sought to deflect 
criticisms of grassroots culture rather than trying to identify and resolve 
conflicts and contradictions which might prevent it from achieving its full 
potential. Too often, we have celebrated those alternative voices which are 
being brought into the marketplace of ideas without considering which 
voices remain trapped outside (Jenkins 2008, 293-294). 
 
Likewise, in “Rethinking ‘Rethinking Convergence/Culture,’” Jenkins explains that 
the long history of participation “should be sobering, as we encounter such a record of 
bold predictions, promises delayed and deferred, partial successes and unintended 
consequences [that] should make us slow to construct triumphant narratives of 
technological inevitability” (2014, 270). What is “inevitable” in this context is the 
belief that progressive grassroots movements would eventually metastasize into a 
political powerhouse capable of toppling “Governments of the Industrial World,” as 
pronounced confidently by John Perry Barlow in 1996. In this article, Jenkins clearly 
articulates a “growing concern that networked communications would not necessarily 
result in a more progressive, inclusive, or democratic culture” (2014, 270). Indeed, 
both the elections of Barack Obama (Sandvoss 2013) and Donald Trump were 
energized, at least in part, by waves of support from online territories, evincing a 
dialectic struggle for political hegemony. 
 In many ways, Jenkins could be read here as prophesizing the emergence of 
the so-called “alt-right,” an umbrella term for “an amorphous, ideologically diffuse, 
and largely online movement” (Heikkilä, 2017: 2) that became visible in mainstream 
media and political discourse in the run up to the US Presidential Election in 2016. 
Naturally, the “alt-right” did not suddenly spring up from out of nowhere: “White 
nationalism had been lurking on the fringes of the American political right for a 
couple of decades before the alt-right came along to give it fresh new life, rewired for 
the twenty-first century” (Neiwert 2017, 220). A series of forces and factors 
contributed to this very loose-knit dispersion of neo-Nazis, white supremacists, Men’s 
rights activists (MRAs), white tribalists and “other ideological groups” (Heikkilä, 
2017: 2), achieving that which they desired most of all, that is, mainstream 
recognition and validation.  
 One of the ways that so-called “alt-right” agents attempt to infiltrate the 
mainstream with ideology is through “metapolitics,” a strategy “that would gradually 
transform the political and intellectual culture as a precursor to transforming 
institutions and systems” (Lyons 2017, 10; see also Proctor 2019). In other words, 
attacking artefacts of pop culture that are viewed as “politically correct” becomes one 
of the ways that the “alt-right” can spread ideological “messages,” and the 
mainstream news media’s “constant churn of outrage and spectacle” (Beckett 2017) 
has been enormously beneficial to this metapolitical strategy, as claimed by neo-Nazi 
and anti-Semite Andrew Anglin:   
 
This is why I love the media so much—they cover my site with outrage, in 
turn I get more traffic and more on board with my agenda, in turn the media 
produces more spectacle…The coverage only has one effect, which is the 
normalization of our ideas. And it doesn’t take a political scientist to figure 
that out (ibid).   
 
As Matthew Lyons (2017) emphasizes, by turning to (what they see as) PC-inflected 
pop culture facilitates a proliferation of reactionary ideological currents, and the 
mainstream news media has become complicit in making this so by willingly 
providing a platform for otherwise marginal voices to be heard in public, mainstream 
spaces —marginal no longer as a result.  
The most widely publicized outcome of this strategy is what became known as 
#Gamergate in 2014, which has been viewed as the touchtone of both the rise of the 
“alt-right” and the new culture wars. Emerging out of the “toxic technocultures” 
(Massanari 2015) of 4Chan, 8Chan and Reddit, this was a flame war unlike any other. 
Ostensibly centred on ethics in video-game journalism, #Gamergate mushroomed into 
a pugnacious cyber-war between feminist and conservative video-game fans, the 
majority of them male (although not entirely).  
 
On one side were feminists and other liberals who believe the gaming world 
is dominated by males, both as game developers and as members of the 
target audience. This group…argued for greater inclusion of games 
appealing to female audiences. On the other side were males who found such 
talk not merely threatening but a declaration of a “culture war” against white 
males by a nefarious leftist conspiracy (Neiwert 2017, 214). 
 
Computer game developer, Brianna Wu, received a series of tweets from the 
pseudonymous ‘Death to Brianna,’ with death, rape and other violent threats 
becoming commonplace: “I’ve got a K-Bar and I’m coming to your house so I can 
shove it up your cunt”; or “your mutilated corpse will be on the front of page of 
Jezebel and there isn’t jack shit you can do about it” (Mantilla, 2015 87). Anita 
Sarkessian fled her home after one commenter released her address on Twitter—a 
strategy known as “doxxing”—along with the message that he would “come to her 
apartment and rape her to death [and] after I’m done, I’ll ram a tire iron up your cunt” 
(Frank 2014). Other scholars have written extensively about #Gamergate and I don’t 
want to rehearse the entire sordid affair here (see Salter and Blodgett 2017, 91-94; 
Massanari 2015; Todd 2015). But what I will say is that #Gamergate should not be 
viewed as somehow separate from other reactionary discourses that have since been 
awarded the “alt-right” designator. What is certain is that the controversy was in 
many ways the spark that lit the fuse, with fascist villains such as Milo Yiannopoulos, 
Roosh V, and Vox Day achieving a level of fame and infamy as key mouthpieces of 
#Gamergate and, later, the “alt-right.” In this way, the #Gamergate controversy 
“heralded the rise of the alt-right and provided an early sketch of its primary features” 
(Briewert 2017, 215).  
 It is not only video games that have been attacked for “political correctness” 
and progressive biases. #Gamergate may have been an early firing shot across the 
bow of pop culture, but as an instrumental characteristic of rightist metapolitical 
warfare, other cultural artefacts have been at the centre of such conflicts, much of 
them without any success whatsoever (which is often sadly missing from many 
journalistic accounts). The controversy surrounding the science fiction genre’s Hugo 
Awards was centred on the same type of metapolitical warfare, with reactionary fans 
hijacking the nomination for so-called “message fiction” that is, sci-fi literature with a 
left-wing bent. Commonly referred to as “the sad puppies,” and led by Theodore 
Beale (a.k.a Vox Day), the campaign involved attempting to ensure that such 
“message fiction” did not receive any award nominations, a strategy that largely failed 
(Sandifer 2017; Stevens and Watson 2018). 
 As the “alt-right” started to gain mainstream recognition, the metapolitical 
lens has been turned onto other aspects of pop culture, often signified by what we 
might describe as “boycott culture,” many of which also failed (often spectacularly 
so). For example, novelist Stephen King used Twitter to heavily criticize US 
President Donald Trump, leading to cries from “Redditers” to boycott Andy 
Muschetti’s adaptation of King’s 1986 novel, IT (2017):  
 
Okay, Everyone. Please DO NOT go see Stephen King's new 'IT' movie this 
weekend when it opens. If you have to see it, wait till after opening weekend 
so he has a lousy showing this week. Trump stands up for us, so we should 
stand up for him!" (Sellinger 2017; Shapiro 2017).  
 
However, as the film quickly smashed box office records for horror cinema (in 
unadjusted dollars), it became evident that the boycott wasn’t an efficacious strategy.  
The same can be said of calls to boycott the hit Broadway musical, Hamilton. 
In November 2016, Vice President-Elect Mike Pence was confronted with catcalls 
and jeers from an energetic crowd during a performance of Hamilton, which was 
followed by a direct address at the end of the show from cast-member Brandon Victor 
Dixon, who stated: 
 
We are the diverse America who are alarmed and anxious that your new 
administration will not protect us, our planet, our children, our parents, or 
defend us and uphold our inalienable rights. But we hope this show has 
inspired you to uphold our American values, and work on behalf of all of us 
(Kelley 2016; Walters 2016).   
 
Following a series of angry tweets from Donald Trump demanding apologies for 
Pence, conservative supporters started the hashtag #boycotthamilton which, as with 
IT, achieved little impact as tickets sold out (and continue to do so). That said, it is 
noteworthy that a boycott campaign such as these, and many others, do not 
necessarily include identification with so-called “alt-right” membership, which 
indicates that anti-PC discourses of this nature are automatically awarded “alt-right” 
status, thus discursively overamplifying and overtly validating the “alt-right” as a 
coherent ideological collective, when in reality it is nothing of the sort.  
What is difficult to quantify in these cases, especially for academic study, is 
whether or not these boycott campaigns—if we can even describe them as 
orchestrated “campaigns” at all—were comprised of fans, neo-Nazis and other 
reactionary agents, general right-wing sympathizers, or nasty trollers out to provoke 
and terrorise “for the lulz” (Phillips 2015). This is something that academia has not 
yet quite got to grips with in methodological and epistemological terms. That is not to 
say that #Gamergate, the “sad puppies” and other campaigns and boycotts are but a 
storm in a teacup—clearly, the war waged against feminism and SJWs (a pejorative 
term for “Social Justice Warriors”) and what gamergaters described as “cultural 
Marxism” (whatever that means) was virulent and vicious, with some women living 
in fear that threats would be carried out. But how many people were involved in 
sending horrific threats of this sort? How can this be quantified through research? I 
have asked these questions on a number of occasions, including in this book (on 
#blackstormtrooper in chapter 17), but I should clearly articulate that I am not 
attempting to defend fans nor argue that there has not been an insurgence of radical 
right-wing rhetoric in cyberspace. Ultimately, what I am saying is that mainstream 
journalism has been complicit in tipping the discursive scales enormously by focusing 
primarily on the spectacle and sensation enacted by “toxic” agents, while being less 
interested in users that pushback against discourses of this type, so much so that the 
“regime of truth” built up around these “new culture wars” has skewed the portraiture 
in favour of reactionary ends, be it inadvertently or not. Mainstream entertainment 
media and journalism in general (including fan blogs and websites) have tended to 
offer much more space to right-wing ideologies, if only to express outrage and virtue 
as a way to demonstrate progressive ideologies and political world-views.    
But one of the severe consequences of this imbalance is that it appears that, in 
its many guises, “the new culture wars” are a lost cause for progressive politics with 
the radical right seemingly standing triumphant. The situation, however, is more 
concretely the antithesis of what is being reported in mainstream journalism; the most 
hateful, violent rhetoric—the rape and death threats, the doxxing, the racism, sexism, 
homophobia, etcetera—emanates from a minority; a very loud minority, to be sure, 
but a minority nonetheless. As video-game fan Jennifer Reed put it:  
 
‘We’ including countless women are not harassing Anita and Zoe. A 
SELECT MINORITY within the gaming community are harassing her, and 
that is extremely offensive to people such as myself who love the gaming 
community and have never been harassed for being female. Those people do 
not represent gamers. We do not hate women. This hasn't even been about 
Anita or Quinn for the past several days. If you want to see some positivity, 
check out the #GamerGate tag (Frank 2014). 
 
 
It is within this context that Disney’s Star Wars became a lightning rod for “the new 
culture wars” and the metapolitics of the “alt-right,” largely anchored onto 
representations of equality and diversity in Disney’s Star Wars films, to which I now 
turn.  
 
The Boycott Wars Saga 
 
As with the various boycott “campaigns” mentioned above, there has been a 
continuation of the “regime of truth” about “toxic fan practices” (Proctor and Kies 
2018), an overamplification of right-wing rhetoric in mainstream news discourse 
operating in parallel to a kind of progressive neutering (or, at the very least, a palpable 
quietening). I have already examined the #blackstormtrooper “controversy” in this 
book, and I don’t want to regurgitate that argument here except a reminder that the 
hashtag in question was overwhelmingly replete with attacks on an imagined and 
imaginary population of “toxic” racist fan-boys, with many progressive messages 
performing a brand of what can be viewed as “toxicity” of a more progressive nature.  
 The Force Awakens was criticised by a vocal minority for political correctness 
and liberal identity politics, with several amorphous boycott campaigns achieving 
widespread media attention, and resulting in further amplification and fermentation of 
the “regime of truth.” However, what is strikingly absent across press discourse is a 
quantitative examination of boycotts enacted through social media hashtags, most of 
which explicitly contain a minority of reactionary agents compared with a critical 
majority that were pushing back, as with #blackstormtrooper.  
 Consider #BoycottStarWarsVII, a hashtag which was activated on Sunday 
October 11th 2016 and swiftly became the number one trending topic on Twitter the 
following day. Introductory comments included complaints like “the Star Wars 
movie…barely has any whites in it,” “J.J Abrams’ political correctness is a code word 
for anti-white,” and “white children deserve wholesome movies, not PC anti-white 
diversity crap.” Another anonymous commenter tweeted, “Let’s get 
#BoycottStarWarsVII trending.” However, as reported by Josh Dickey for 
entertainment website Mashable,  
 
Of everyone who tweeted the hashtag #BoycottStarWarsVII on Monday, 
94% were merely expressing outrage over its existence, according to a 
statistically relevant sample examined by social media and analytics firm 
Fizziology for Mashable. The other 6% were ‘racist trolls trying to get 
people mad,’ the firm told Mashable, adding that many of them also used 
their rants to campaign for Donald Trump (Dickey 2015).  
 
 
Over on 4Chan’s “politically incorrect/ pol/ thread,” as recounted by Dickey, the 
several trolls were relishing in the impact of the hashtag, with one user instructing 
“EVERYONE GET ON TWITTER THE ALT-RIGHT IS TRIGGERING SJWS” 
(ibid). Numerous mainstream news outlets accepted the trolling operation at face 
value, with The Hollywood Reporter’s Graeme Macmillan describing the hashtag as a 
“social media movement” (2015, my emphasis) or “a bunch of white supremacists,” in 
Anna Silman’s account for Salon, both of which was commonly hyperlinked on social 
media. The trolls rejoiced.  On 4Chan: “WE DID IT AGAIN.” On Twitter: “We made 
a racial issue out of thin air!” (O’Neil 2015).  
In fairness, Silman later mentioned that “the hashtag seems to have been 
mostly co-opted by reasonable people at this point,” but leading with emotive 
headlines is freighted with sensation and bias, such as Wired’s Matt Kamen (2015) 
announcing that “Racists want to #BoyCottStarWarsVII because it’s ‘anti-
white,’”while explaining later in the article that “[t]he vocal minority sincerely using 
BoycottStarWarsVII is just that—a minority.” However, Kamen’s claim that the 
hashtag is “equally being used to deride those actually calling for a boycott” is 
problematic given that the contents were not “equal” at all, but in favour of anti-racist 
commenters by a wide margin.  
Writing for Esquire, Luke O’Neil (2016) expressed concern about the 
hyperbole and sensation underpinning a lot of news reports indignantly focused on the 
hashtag at the expense of “real” news, which is worth quoting at length: 
 
For almost the entirety of the hashtag’s run, it was dominated by people 
commenting on how terrible it was, with very little noise coming from actual 
racists…That’s because there weren’t that many of them involved…No 
reporter would file a story based solely on the deranged ramblings of an 
anonymous, obviously deranged person screaming on the street, so why do 
so many of us continue to do this when it comes to isolated pockets of 
Twitter users? Group if Assholes Says Something Stupid just isn’t a 
newsworthy story. But, when you can affix that angle to a mention of Star 
Wars, then it makes more sense. People are hungry for any sort of news 
about the film, and when you add in the element of outrage, it’s an orgy of 
clicks for everyone, including the inevitable dénouement when we get to 
write shaming anti-reaction-reaction pieces like this one.    
 
In many ways, then, the “regime of truth” constructed around boycott 
campaigns of this nature by not only professional entertainment channels, but also fan 
websites and blogs, are validating these kinds of viewpoints by airing them publically 
and thus being complicit in the metapolitics of the “alt-right,” whether trollers 
involved in campaigns of this kind identify as such or not. That said, my argument 
here is not that Star Wars fandom is a homogenous, progressive “community,” and 
that trollers are inherently “non-fans” by default. What I am saying is that the 
widespread focus on toxic fan practices, if indeed such boycotters are fans (which 
isn’t to claim that they’re not either) augments the “regime of truth” in favour of 
reactionary ends. This has, unfortunately, become a common feature of entertainment 
criticism in professional and fan spheres across online territories. 
 The boycott discourse gathered steam again prior to the release of Rogue One 
in 2016, which was enmeshed with the US Presidential election. The hashtag 
#dumpstarwars protested the multi-racial cast and the second female protagonist in 
Star Wars history with Felicity Jones’ Jyn Erso, less a year after Daisy Ridley’s Rey 
received a similar backlash from a minority of complainers—which didn’t prevent the 
film from raking in $2 billion-plus in box office receipts and becoming the second-
largest grossing film in history in unadjusted dollars (Carissimo 2016). Rogue One 
was, however, accused of anti-white propaganda well in advance of the film hitting 
theatres in December 2016, but as the race for the White House heated up, a series of 
tweets by the film’s screenwriter Chris Weitz ended up drawing fire from “alt-right” 
mouthpieces, such as Jack Posobiec and Mike Cernovich. Weitz tweeted his support 
for Hillary Clinton, with the words “more female heroes” branded upon an image of 
the rebel insignia, followed by another tweet comprising a photograph of Jyn Erso 
above the message: “Are you with her?”  
 As reality TV star and real estate mogul Donald Trump declared victory in 
November 2016, Weitz again incensed right-wing ideologues on Twitter by equating 
Trump and his supporters not with the rebels, as they preferred to see it, but with the 
villains. “Please note,” tweeted Weitz, “the Empire is a white supremacist 
organization.” This was followed up with an addendum from Gary Whitta: “Opposed 
by a multicultural group led by brave women” (Ellis 2016; Siegel 2016).  
 In the days that followed, these tweets were taken down and replaced with an 
image of the rebel insignia with a safety pin attached—the pin being a symbol of 
solidarity amongst diverse and disenfranchised publics in the UK after the Brexit 
referendum, and co-opted for anti-Trump sympathizers in the US—and an incendiary 
message guaranteed to raise the hackles of “alt-right” sympathizers: “Star Wars 
against hate. Spread it” (McMillan 2016). It is within this context that right-wing 
troller par excellence Jack Posobiec launched hashtag #DumpStarWars. 
 Whether or not it was Lucasfilm executives that requested Weitz and Whitta 
take down these political tweets is difficult to ascertain, Disney CEO Robert Iger tried 
to neuter the conflict in interview by insisting that Rogue One    
 
 
is not a film that is, in any way, a political film. There are no 
political statements in it, at all. [Rogue One] has one of the greatest 
and most diverse casts of any film we have ever made and we are 
very proud of that, and that is not a political statement, at all 
(Galuppo, 2016). 
 
It is more than likely that Iger was anxious that the politicization of Rogue One could 
negatively impact the film’s box office, as pointed out by Tatiana Siegel for The 
Hollywood Reporter (2016):     
 [w]hat Disney and Lucasfilm might not be thrilled about is that a 
Trump ‘Empire’ versus Hilary Clinton ‘resistance’ narrative might 
alienate the 61million-plus voters who backed the real estate mogul, 
a group too large to ignore when a company is in the tent-pole 
business…In the Trump age, if the right-leaning media can help tip 
a presidential election, it’s reasonable to assume it can impact 
grosses. 
 
As with the boycotts discussed earlier, Rogue One’s theatrical release demonstrated 
that #DumpStarWars hardly mattered. Although the film’s box office paled in 
comparison with the record-breaking haul of its predecessor, The Force Awakens, 
Rogue One managed to capture over $1 billion dollars in box office receipts. Given 
that The Force Awakens was the first Star Wars film in a decade, the first since the 
Disney acquisition of Lucasfilm, and the first Skywalker saga instalment since Lucas 
had dictated that the series was complete (see chapter one in this book), as well as 
Rogue One being a litmus test for the “anthology” series, it is highly probable that the 
film was unlikely to achieve a similar level of box office traffic. Yet as liberal news 
media rejoiced that the boycott #DumpStarWars had failed (Friedman 2016; 
Hathaway 2016; Peyser 2016), “alt-right” identifiers claimed that the campaign was 
successful. Jack Posobiec, for instance, argued that Rogue One’s “opening weekend 
was roughly 40%, or $100 million less than [The Force Awakens],” while Mike 
Cernovich celebrated that the film was “not a huge hit, lost money compared to last 
Star Wars.” However, some fans responded to these claims on social media and the 
hashtag #DumpStarWars, such as “Star Wars Junk Man,” who tweeted that “only 2 
movies has every (sic) made over 85 million opening weekend in December. Both are 
#StarWars films” (https://twitter.com/StarWarsJunk/status /810991987155496960).  
 It is more illuminating perhaps that the contents of #DumpStarWars contain 
over 50% more tweets mocking the very few boycotters within, with a significant 
uptick in traffic following news of Rogue One’s box office (which was used often as a 
way to bait the complainers). Indeed, the vast majority of comments were from anti-
boycotters, regardless of what Posobiec and Cernovich claim about the campaign’s 
success. Like #blackstormtrooper, scraping the contents of hashtags and conducting a 
discourse and/ or content analysis is certainly one of the ways that academic study can 
challenge the overamplication and hyperbole that has become part and parcel of 
mainstream media discourse.  
It is during this period that the radical right were given a brand makeover as 
the “alt-right,” and this usage has accelerated in the aftermath of the US 2016 
Presidential Election when Donald Trump proved to be 
  
a particularly unifying force for the Ku Klux Klan, splinter white 
nationalist groups, and the cacophony of reactionists, antagonists, 
and neo-supremacists that have come to be known as the alt-right, 
all of whom have declared, publically and enthusiastically, their 
support for a candidate who ‘gets it’ (Phillips and Milner 2017, 
180). 
 
It should hopefully be clear at this juncture that the “alt-right” and “toxic fandom” is 
intrinsically and nebulously intertwined in a discursive Gordian knot of excessive 
proportions of which Star Wars is but one element. To complicate matters further, 
“toxic” Star Wars fans do not all identify as “alt-right” ideologues, and many 
complaints can be framed as fidelity criticisms, conservative though they may be. It is 
not a new phenomenon that fan audiences tend to cry foul when beloved franchises 
and storyworlds adapt and shift in accordance with social and cultural mores, such as 
accommodating a marked uptick in multicultural and female representations in pop 
culture. Naturally, this is not to argue that manifestations of reactionary viewpoints 
should be condoned, but to ask that more meaningful exegeses take place as opposed 
to descriptions of “toxic fandom” being framed as legitimately emanating from the 
“alt-right.”  
 Consider the brouhaha surrounding The Last Jedi, a film that was not only 
critically heralded as “transporting entertainment” (Dargis 2017), “an emotional 
wallop” (Freer 2017), “a tidal wave of energy and emotion” (Bradshaw 2017) and “a 
blockbuster movie packed with invention, wit, and action galore” (Gompertz 2017), 
but one that also received a ferocious backlash not seen since The Phantom Menace. I 
have written about the critical discourse surrounding The Last Jedi at length 
elsewhere (see Proctor 2018a; 2018b; 2018c), but it would be helpful to summarize 
the way in which news media seemed to want to illustrate that an “alt-right” 
conspiracy was afoot, primarily because of the lack of consensus regarding the film’s 
quality. Ultimately, the notion of fan “community” becomes continuously invoked as 
having been “broken” by The Last Jedi and thus a firm indication that journalists—
and fans as well—projected a utopian portrait of Star Wars fandom as a homogenous 
collective. 
 
The Last Jedi 
 
Prior to the global release of The Last Jedi in cinemas on 17th December 2017, the 
film was premiered to select audiences and critics on 9th December in Los Angeles 
and on 12th December in Europe. With a review embargo in place until the film’s 
official release, some fans took to social media to champion the film and, once the 
embargo was lifted, critics joined in the chorus of celebrations as well, although not 
invariably (for example see Brody 2017; Gleiberman 2017; Taylor 2017). However, 
in the days following the film’s general release, a different critical outlook began to 
surface, with many entertainment critics, journalists and fans eagerly querying the 
legitimacy of the meta-scoring site Rotten Tomatoes, which indicated a gulf between 
professional reviews and audience reception. Since then, this gulf has only increased: 
at the time of writing (September 2018), the critical score stands 91% against an 
audience score of 46%.  
 This rapidly became a cause for concern as journalists and bloggers could not 
accept that The Last Jedi could be both critically praised and vilified simultaneously. 
“It became clear for the world to see that something was seriously amiss when a huge 
discrepancy opened between the critical and audience scores for the movie on Rotten 
Tomatoes,” explained Jordan Zakarin for SyFy.com (2018).  
   
Critics largely showered it with praise, while registered moviegoers gave it a 
failing grade; right now, it stands at 91 percent ‘fresh’ from professional film 
critics, but has just a 50 percent audience score. The gulf is an anomaly, 
which we know both because moviegoers gave largely positive assessments 
of the film to the polling firm ComScore and because a member of an alt-
right fan group proudly told HuffPost that dissatisfied fans sent bots to 
deliberately lower the Tomatometer. 
  
In Zakarin’s account here, polling by ComScore is constructed as an efficacious and 
accurate reflection of audience tastes, while Rotten Tomatoes is not. Naturally, I do 
not intend to argue the obverse—Rotten Tomatoes is not an accurate barometer of 
popular opinion either—but the fact that “moviegoers gave largely positive 
assessments to ComScore” tells us little about the wider parameters of audience 
reception. (And I am certain I do not need to go into statistical flaws about polling in 
general, especially regarding the results of the Brexit referendum, the US Presidential 
election or the UK “snap election” of May 2017.) But what is noteworthy in Zakarin’s 
article is the final sentence which claims that Rotten Tomatoes had been infiltrated by 
“a member of an alt-right fan group [who] proudly told HuffPost that dissatisfied fans 
sent bots to deliberately lower the Tomatometer.”  
 On 20 December 2017, The Huffington Post’s Bill Bradley headlined: 
“Surprise Surprise: The Alt Right Claims Credit for ‘Last Jedi’ Backlash.” In this 
article, Bradley writes that a Facebook group “Down with Disney’s Treatment of 
Franchise’s and its Fanboys” was responsible for sending “bots” through the internet 
to torpedo the Rotten Tomatoes score, the evidence of which was discussed with 
“Down with Disney” through Facebook messenger (which Bradley provides 
screenshots of). When asked by Bradley to provide evidence of the way that bot 
attacks were orchestrated, Down With Disney replies, “that’s confidential,” then later 
explained that a tech-savvy friend assisted with the “review bombing” (note the 
semantics of terrorism used here and in the headline, “takes credit for”). At no point 
does the poster identify with, or use the term, “alt-right.”  
 The story did not begin with Bradley, however, but the “alt-right” angle 
certainly did. The first news story to mention Down with Disney was on Deadbeat, 
but with no description of “alt-right” membership (D’Alessandro 2017). This was 
then picked up by Julie Alexander of Polygon (2017), who wrote that Down with 
Disney is “a Pro-DCEU [DC Expanded Universe] community,” but later added an 
update following Bradley’s “alt-right” article: “After reports of the attack being 
organized by a right-wing group began to circulate, a Rotten Tomatoes representative 
told Polygon that its security team and database experts ‘haven’t determined there to 
be any problems.’” 
 
As the story began to be reproduced across cyberspace, the discourse gathered apace 
and mushroomed into a regime of truth whereby Down with Disney is discursively 
awarded “alt-right” status, clear indicating that The Last Jedi’s Rotten Tomatoes score 
was the result of “alt-right” orchestration as emphasised by Zakarin’s article above, 
but also reproduced in publications, as varied as (but not limited to): the Chicago 
Tribune (Page 2017); NME (Trendell 2017), Indiewire (Sharf 2017), Newsweek 
(Amhed 2017), Slash Film (Bui 2017), The Wrap (Verhoeven 2017) GQ (Darby 
2017), Nylon (Manders 2017), Complex (Pimentel 2017), AV Club (Rife 2017), Vice 
(Schwartz 2017), Pajiba (Preston 2017), and many more besides. (One might wonder 
why other news outlets such as, say, The Guardian, The New York Times, The 
Washington Post etc., chose not to run this story).  
On Down with Disney’s official Facebook page, a different narrative emerges. 
First, over 98% of commenters were pillorying the poster for espousing misogyny and 
racism, which is entirely missing from Bradley’s account. Second, the anonymous 
Down with Disney is not representative of “the alt-right” at all, but an anonymous 
male individual who is widely known as a Facebook troller. Thirdly, and perhaps 
most pointedly, is that other Star Wars fan groups challenged Down with Disney by 
claiming that they impacted the Rotten Tomatoes score, such as the “Star Wars Anti-
Disney Pro-Canon” Facebook group, who wrote: 
 
WE DID THIS! Not the fake page Down with Disney. We brought the 
Rotten Tomatoes score down. And we didn’t have to use bots either. You 
claim to do something you never did…You sit on a throne of lies! We had 
our supporters do down vote the movie without seeing it. We are the ones 
should be getting praise not you.  
 
Whether or not either of these groups orchestrated a “review bombing” campaign 
matters less in this context as much as “the regime of truth” that developed around the 
“alt-right” being responsible. It is entirely possible—even plausible—that a certain 
number of fans attempted to downgrade the audience scores on Rotten Tomatoes as a 
protest against Disney’s Star Wars and what may be viewed as a political correct shift 
in equality and diversity. It is not only that the press “has erred on the side of 
overexposure” regarding stories about “the alt-right,” as emphasized by Wired’s Issie 
Lapowski (2017), or that this ends up shining “too bright a light on them and risk[s] 
amplifying their message—or worse, attracting new acolytes to the cause” (ibid). 
More pointedly, it appears that mainstream media have been complicit in constructing 
Down with Disney as a legitimate chapter of the “alt-right” when, in reality, the 
Facebook “community”—a community of one—is a notorious troller without much in 
the way of support at all.  
 More recently, both the “Star Wars Anti-Disney Pro-Canon” and Down with 
Disney Facebook pages have been taken down. In place of the former, a new page has 
surfaced called the “Star Wars Anti-Disney Pro-Canon Parody” group, which contains 
commenters teasing the person in no uncertain terms who launched the original page 
(whose real name is revealed), as well as several attacks on Down with Disney’s 
misogynist and racist rhetoric, as well as his lack of fan cultural capital. But Down 
with Disney’s infamy would live on and proliferate once again in February 2018, this 
time around Marvel’s Black Panther, and again led by Bill Bradley (2018) of The 
Huffington Post, headlining: “‘Alt-Right' Group Takes Aim At ‘Black Panther.’ Ryan 
Coogler Responds.” On this occasion, more reputable news outlets did run the story, 
including The Guardian (Virtue 2018); International Business Times (Gander 2018), 
Variety (Fernandez 2018); and The Washington Post (Cavna 2018), to name a select 
few. All of this kerfuffle because of a Facebook post comprised of the following 
words: “Give Black Panther a Rotten Audience Score on Rotten Tomatoes” (one 
should wonder what has happened to Down with Disney’s bots on this occasion or 
query the Rotten Tomatoes score, which is split 97% for critics and 79% for 
audiences).  
And it didn’t stop there either. In June 2018, The Guardian’s Catherine 
Shoard ran an article about Down with Disney, who had been kicked off Facebook in 
February but had returned after a ban to claim responsibility for the online abuse 
leveled at The Last Jedi actor Kelly Marie Tran, who left social media as a result and 
to which she has since responded in The New York Times (Tran 2018). Unlike 
Bradley, Shroard doesn’t evoke the “alt-right” political noun, preferring “Pro-
‘straight-white-male group’”’—a description that was reproduced by Mel Evans 
(2018) in Metro—while in The Washington Post, Michael Cavna reverts to type with 
“the now removed ‘alt-right’ Facebook page” (2018).  
At this point, there have been over sixty articles written about Down with 
Disney as an “alt-right” group. That one anonymous and infamous social media troller 
should be able to attract such a massive amount of publicity is astonishing and 
worrying, not least because it works to publicize “alt-right” philosophies even when   
Kelly Marie Tran has certainly been the recipient of racist and sexist 
ideologies on websites such as Instagram and Wookiepedia, so I am in no way 
attempting to argue that Star Wars is somehow immune from “new culture war” 
skirmishes. But how would we know if these attacks were orchestrated by the “alt-
right,” whose metapolitical strategy is not to mask political affiliation and identity 
but, rather, to openly evoke “alt-right” branding to infiltrate mainstream discourse and 
spread ideological currents.  
As for The Last Jedi, I would argue that it has become academically urgent to 
explore and examine discourses of this nature with rigorous research protocols to test 
and measure more effectively “the regime of truth.” Perhaps the best way of checking 
the veracity of Rotten Tomatoes scores and whether or not audience reviews are 
aligned with right-wing ideologies, political correctness and “the new culture wars” is 
to fully examine the entire contents therein (which of course would be time-
consuming). It is possible that reviewers may mask their political viewpoints, but it is 
better than relying on supposition, conjecture and imputation. As the current “regime 
of truth” is heavily weighted in favor of reactionary ends and agents, it is becoming 
an essential scholarly endeavor, I would argue, to better examine these “new culture 
wars” with as much accuracy as possible rather than embrace press discourse 
unequivocally. Unfortunately, academic literature has also started to marshal 
parochial and partisan viewpoints, adding to the culture of fear produced by 
mainstream news and entertainment discourses. The “regime of truth” may well 
illustrate that the left is losing “the new culture wars” but, as I have hopefully started 
to show in this chapter, once we begin tapping into hashtags, forums, comments 
section and other online user-generated portals, the picture becomes evidently more 
complex and less reactionary than we might think. Put differently, all of the energy 
spent on Down with Disney is considerably less than news articles centred on positive 
aspects of Star Wars fandom, such as the #ForceOutHate campaign or the Expanded 
Universe Movement’s Twin Suns charity initiative, both of which have received little 
mainstream media attention. From this perspective, entertainment journalism enacts a 
kind of cultural rubbernecking, attracted to drama, sensation and the “car crashes” of 
pop culture. This is much more than about Star Wars—it is about media bias and 
“information disorder” (Wardle 2017) in the twenty-first century. 
 
Conclusion: Fracture, Fallout or Fatigue? 
 
The “regime of truth” that has since emerged regarding the impact of The Last Jedi’s 
divisiveness has had many news and fan sites announcing that the Star Wars fandom 
is “notoriously toxic, and you don’t have to look very far for evidence,” as stated by 
Joshua Rivera (2018). “It’s embarrassing to share a passion with…a small yet 
splenetic subsection of so-called ‘fans,’” writes Luke Holland in The Guardian, 
(2018). For Brandon Katz (2018) writing for Observer.com: “Something is deeply 
broken among the Star Wars faithful. Respectable discourse has deteriorated 
completely as a small but determined minority of ‘fans’ turn to the Dark Side—hate-
spewing assholes looking to ruin the party for everyone.”  
Wired’s Adam Rogers (2018) offered the “three tenets of Nerd,” illustrating that 
this notion of “fan-as-community” is a common discourse amongst journalists and 
fans themselves (or “journalist-fans”): 
 
1. A nerd must not harm another nerd, or through inaction allow a nerd to come 
to harm. 
2. Nerds must cooperate with other nerds, except where such cooperation would 
violate the previous tenet.  
3. Nerds must protect the existence of nerddom, except where such protection 
violates the first two tenets.   
 
While these tenets are certainly aspirational, it is worth remembering that fandom is 
most often a site of savage argument than a utopian “community” built on the 
principles of solidarity. Naturally, harming another “nerd” is as morally despicable as 
harming anyone, whether fan or not; but this notion of cooperation and protection is 
not usually how fandom functions in general. Again, it is certainly a honourable 
philosophy, however unlikely. Star Wars fandom isn’t “broken” or “fractured” 
(Reinhard 2018)—as an abstract concept that cannot be quantified substantively or 
entirely, fandom has never been in a state of unity from which it might be broken and 
in need of repair. The Last Jedi certainly became a hot spot for these kinds of 
arguments, primarily because the film was so divisive among fans (although division 
again implies a rupturing of “community”). As mentioned earlier, what seems to be 
surprising to many critics and fans is that The Last Jedi might be loved and hated 
simultaneously, but by different kinds of fans. The lack of fannish consensus became a 
gateway to all sorts of theories, and suppositions, resulting in the construction of a 
reductive and oversimplified binary, a “moral dualism” (Hills 2002), between “good” 
progressive fans of The Last Jedi that loved the film, and “bad” reactionary fans that 
hated it. As The Hollywood Reporter’s Marc Bernadin (2018) put it: 
 
Some loved the bold liberties of writer-director Rian Johnson…But others 
hated it. Hated everything it stood for. Hated what they saw as a social 
justice warrior remix of the Star Wars they grew up with. And they hated 
[Kelly Marie] Tran’s most of all because they decided that she was the avatar 
for what was wrong with the franchise. Those fans—a minority but a loud 
one—found their “them” in the very thing they used to love.  
 
For all the talk about toxic fans being a minority faction of a wider fan “community,” 
it is puzzling to read vaunted claims that this minority might well have impacted the 
box office for Solo: A Star Wars Story, the first Star Wars film following The Last 
Jedi, which “officially became the first Star Wars movie to flop” (Stefansky 2018). 
But Solo was nothing if not a turbulent production almost from the off.  
 Firstly, directors Phil Lord and Chris Miller were fired due to creative 
differences with Ron Howard stepping in as director. Secondly, numerous reports 
claimed that young Han Solo actor Alden Ehrenreich required lessons from an acting 
coach (hardly an indicator of confidence in the film). Thirdly, replacing Harrison Ford 
was always going to be a risky proposition and Star Wars prequels don’t have a 
positive history. And finally, marketing for the film was exceptionally belated, the 
first teaser trailer premiering only a few months before Solo’s theatrical release 
(compared with The Force Awakens teaser trailer coming a full year before it was 
distributed). If The Force Awakens’ “Comic-Con Reel” operated to paratextually 
rehabilitate the franchise and steer negative criticisms away from prequel territory, 
then it stands to reason that unpoliced negative reports may achieve the opposite by 
functioning as a paratextual “red flag” (see Hassler-Forest’s chapter in this book).    
  Numerous articles also suggested that Solo’s box office failings indicated that 
audiences were “fatigued” with Star Wars (Cotter 2018; Coyle 2018; Rubin 2018; 
Sims 2018), but if compared with Marvel, one of Disney’s other twenty-first century 
acquisitions, this makes little sense. Since 2008, the Marvel Cinematic Universe 
(MCU) has rapidly grown into a franchise powerhouse, spreading transmedially 
across film, television and streaming platforms. In cinematic terms, Marvel Studios 
have released twenty MCU films theatrically in ten years, with a schedule that has not 
slowed down over time, but accelerated. In 2018, the films Black Panther, Avengers: 
Infinity War and Ant-Man and the Wasp have all performed well, both in critical and 
commercial spheres—with Black Panther and Avengers: Infinity War crossing the $2 
billion line. Between 2015 and 2018, Disney’s Lucasfilm produced four Star Wars 
films—The Force Awakens, Rogue One, The Last Jedi and Solo—while during the 
same period Disney’s Marvel released eight MCU films—Captain America: Civil 
War (2016), Doctor Strange (2016), Guardians of the Galaxy Vol. 2 (2017), Spider-
Man: Homecoming (2017), Thor: Ragnarok (2017), and the aforementioned 
triumvirate of films in 2018. Rather than indicating signs of exhaustion and fatigue, or 
the law of diminishing returns, the MCU certainly seems to be in rude health, with 
Avengers: Infinity War now standing as the most successful film in the franchise at 
the time of this writing (August 2018). With no new Star Wars films on the release 
roster until J.J Abrams’ Episode IX in December 2019, Marvel Studios in the 
meantime will have added yet another three films to the MCU before then, with 
Captain Marvel, the second-part of Avengers: Infinity War, and Spider-Man: Far 
From Home (all 2019). By the time the conclusion of the Skywalker Saga is 
distributed theatrically—if indeed Episode IX will conclude the story or lead into 
another trilogy at a later date—the ratio between Lucasfilm and Marvel Studios 
cinematic outputs will be 5 films to 11. Put differently, Marvel’s cinematic output will 
quantitatively exceed fifty per cent more compared with Star Wars films produced 
within the same four-year period.  
 Of course, Star Wars and Marvel are very different beasts and I do not mean 
to claim that the former simply cannot fatigue audiences because the latter continues 
to attract significant critical praise and box office receipts; although I will say that it 
seems to be clear that Marvel is healthier than Star Wars at this juncture, both 
commercially and critically. It is entirely possible, however speculative, that one of 
the reasons that Star Wars has been a crown jewel of franchise cinema is precisely 
because there has been less content produced, at least in filmic terms, and thus 
marked it out as somehow “unique.” The case of Solo is particularly interesting given 
that it has been viewed as the first theatrical “failure” in the franchise’s history, which 
is made all the more remarkable considering the venomous fan backlash against the 
prequels. I contend that there is so much more going on here than mere “franchise 
fatigue,” although we will need to wait and see how the “final” instalment of the 
Skywalker Saga is received in December 2019 to explore whether or not the Star 
Wars brand remains a vibrant franchise property.  
The key argument in this chapter is that news media’s preeminent focus on the 
most virulent and toxic elements of Star Wars fandom has undoubtedly constructed a 
biased narrative, a concretized “regime of truth” whereby a minority of digital users, 
be they fans, trolls or “alt-right” identifiers, are made to look as if they represent a 
majority. In producing—and indeed re-producing—this “regime of truth,” I would 
argue that it is also news media that is “toxic,” or at the very least, dedicated to 
unduly dramatizing toxic narratives at the expense of a fan majority. There is much 
work to be done in this area and the digital environment will continue to be an 
enormous challenge for scholars to examine rigorously and robustly as the war for 
Disney’s Star Wars continues. 	
